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THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S MODERN DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT
Gregory J. Smith*
In November 1987, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit decided Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,' after re-
hearing the case en banc.2 The Federal Circuit in Pennwalt, split-
ting seven to four, affirmed the district court's finding of no
infringement. In doing so, the Pennwalt majority approved some
rules of analysis under the doctrine of equivalents3 that drew a sharp
dissent from Judge Bennett,4 a harsh criticism of the majority's
© 1989 by Gregory J. Smith
* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, IL; B.S.E.E., 1986, General Motors Institute,
Flint, MI; J.D. with high honors, 1989, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
1. 833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
2. Id. at 932. The case was first argued before Cowen, Senior Circuit Judge, and Cir-
cuit Judges, Bennett and Nies in October 1985. At the suggestion of an active judge not on
that panel, the court reconsidered the case en banc. Judge Mayer sat for the rehearing but did
not participate in the decision. Not sitting for the rehearing but participating in the decision
were Judges Cowen and Bennett, who both were on the panel that first heard the case.
3. In Pennwalt, the Federal Circuit for the first time stated that courts should assess
equivalence by comparing the accused device with the claim element by element. Before
Pennwalt expressly approved element-by-element analysis in applying the doctrine of
equivalents, courts and commentators had uniformly believed that the claim must be consid-
ered as a whole, and that the two modes of analysis were mutually exclusive. See 4
D. CHI-SUM, PATENTS § 18.04[1] (1989), where Professor Chisum states that "equivalency is
still determined by comparing the claimed subject matter as a whole and the accused device."
(emphasis in original).
The Federal Circuit also had indicated that assessing equivalence with respect to individ-
ual claim elements is reserved for means-plus-function claims (see 35 U.S.C § 112, para. 6
(1982)) in D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985). But the court
later applied the claim-as-a-whole concept to means-plus-function claims in Texas Instru-
ments, Inc. v. International Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
This paper does not address section 112 equivalence, but the same basic concepts apply to
determine equivalents of either conventional claims or section 112 claims. The key difference
between these two types of equivalence is this: Unlike the doctrine of equivalents, section 112
equivalence is a test for literal infringement. Although the means-plus-function claim does
cover equivalents of the claimed "means," it does not cover equivalents of the claimed function.
Equivalent functions of the means-plus-function claim are covered through the doctrine of
equivalents. For a discussion of section 112 equivalence, see Pennwalt, 833 F.2d 931 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co.,
762 F.2d 969, 974-78 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
4. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 939 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
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statements from Judge Newman in a "commentary," 5 and a concur-
ring opinion from Judge Nies labelled "additional views." '
Pennwalt illustrates a controversy currently plaguing the Fed-
eral Circuit. What is the proper role of the doctrine of equivalents in
patent infringement cases, and how is the doctrine to be applied?
The Federal Circuit's views on the doctrine of equivalents are of
profound importance not only to patent lawyers, but also to the busi-
ness community.7 The Federal Circuit is presently unable to express
a coherent view on the doctrine of equivalents. This inability creates
a question whether the Federal Circuit will fulfill one of its primary
purposes: to expound a uniform and consistent body of patent law. 8
This paper focuses on how the Federal Circuit applies the doc-
trine of equivalents and the accompanying doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel.9 Because the Federal Circuit is now the primary
expositor of the patent law, Part I presents only a brief discussion of
the (pre-Federal Circuit) origin and historical purpose of the doc-
trine of equivalents.
Part II examines how the court assesses equivalence as a factual
matter, and distinguishes equivalence from infringement by
equivalents. This section attempts to reconcile seemingly conflicting
statements by the Federal Circuit. On one hand, the court intimates
that, in assessing equivalence, triers of fact must view the patent
claim "as a whole." On the other hand, the Federal Circuit offers
that a court may properly analyze equivalence "claim-element-by-
claim-element." Part II determines that both viewpoints reflect the
Federal Circuit's shift away from the traditional equitable view that
emphasizes the "heart" of the invention, and toward the view that
emphasizes the boundaries of the invention. In addition, Part II con-
cludes that the Federal Circuit is evolving beyond the position that
courts should invoke the equivalence doctrine only when the equities
5. Id. at 954 (Newman, J., commentary).
6. The opinions break down as follows: the majority opinion was written by Judge
Bissell, who was joined by Chief Judge Markey, and Judges Friedman, Rich, Davis, Nies,
and Archer. Judge Bennett filed a dissent-in-part in which Judges Cowen, Smith and New-
man joined. Judge Nies filed additional views (concurrence), and Judge Newman filed a com-
mentary (dissent). The dissent accused the majority of ignoring Supreme Court precedent and
overruling "sub silentio" many prior Federal Circuit decisions. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 939-54
(Bennett, J., dissenting); id. at 954-75 (Newman, J., commentary).
7. See The New High-Tech Battleground, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1988, § 3, at 1, col. 6
(discussing how consistency in the patent law has increased technological and patent activity).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 97-312, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 20-23 (1981).
9. Prosecution history, or "file wrapper," estoppel: the patentee cannot extend the claim
through equivalents to cover subject matter that the patentee surrendered during prosecution to
obtain the patent. See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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of the particular case at hand so dictate. Rather than instructing
lower courts to expand patent claims through equivalence only to
prevent pirates from stealing the heart of the invention, the Federal
Circuit is indicating that courts should use the doctrine of
equivalents as a common-sense tool to expand the literal scope of
claims in any case, regardless of the equities.
Part III analyzes some recent decisions in the doctrine of prose-
cution history estoppel and examines a trend toward diminishing the
claim-limiting effects of this companion doctrine to the doctrine of
equivalents. Part III also observes the rarity in which prosecution
history estoppel completely forecloses the doctrine of equivalents. Ac-
cordingly, this section concludes that regardless of prosecution his-
tory estoppel's effects, trial courts should thoroughly assess equiva-
lence on the record to avoid a remand and the resulting piecemeal
dispute resolution.
Part IV revisits the history of the doctrine of equivalents and
notes that the custom of requiring trial courts to assess equivalence
adds to the complexity and expense of' patent litigation. But, this
practice better promotes the patent system if made available to all
patentees, not just those confronting an unscrupulous copyist. As a
final point, Part IV notes that the trend toward certainty in the doc-
trine of equivalents-seen as a claim-limiting trend-is balanced by
the concurrent trend to lessen the effects of prosecution history estop-
pel-a claim-enlarging trend.
I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS
Courts do not apply the doctrine of equivalents in every patent
infringement case. Rather, courts must first assess literal infringe-
ment, and, only if there is no literal infringement, may the court
proceed to the doctrine of equivalents."0 Even though there is no lit-
10. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). Al-
though some courts have stated that the patentee must show some special equitable need for
invoking the doctrine, see, e.g., In re Certain Steel Toy Vehicles, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 873,
883-84 (C.C.P.A. 1978), the modern view is that when the basic test of equivalence is met, the
court must find infringement by equivalents, whatever the equitable balance. Durango Assoc.
v. Reflange, Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (remanded for analysis under doctrine
of equivalents though equities not mentioned); ZMI v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d
1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (applied doctrine-although infringement not found-without
mentioning equitable justifications); Hi-Life Prods. v. American Nat'l Water-Mattress Corp.,
842 F.2d 323, 325-26 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (remanded for doctrine of equivalents analysis; no
mention of equities). Cf Harris, Three Ambiguities of the Doctrine of Equivalents in the
Federal Circuit, 69 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 91, 92 n.4 (1987). See also infra note 38.
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eral infringement, the court might nonetheless find infringement
under the judicially-devised doctrine of equivalents." According to
this doctrine, a structure or process infringes a patent claim if the
structure or process performs substantially the same function in sub-
stantially the same way to obtain the same result as does the claimed
structure or process as a whole."2
The doctrine of equivalents developed during a time when
courts placed little emphasis on the language of a patent's claims
when determining the scope of the patent's protection.'" The United
States Supreme Court devised the doctrine of equivalents in Winans
v. Denmead"' to prevent form-the actual claim language-from de-
nying patent protection to the substance of the invention.' 5 In Wi-
nans, the court presumed that the inventor intended to protect the
"whole" invention regardless of the particular claim language; 6
therefore, the Winans Court construed the patent specification liber-
ally as the true measure of protection. 7
The Patent Act of 1870' came after Winans v. Denmead and
made claim language more important. 9 Although the Supreme
Court relied more heavily on the language of the patent claim to
determine infringement, the doctrine of equivalents still provided a
release from the claim's confines in appropriate circumstances.2"
The Supreme Court last discussed the doctrine of equivalents in
the seminal case of Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde
Air Products Co."' The Graver Tank Court observed that in some
situations it would be unfair to place too much emphasis on literal
claim language:
[T]o permit imitation of a patented invention which does not
copy every literal detail would be to convert the patent grant
11. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607-08.
12. Id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
13. See 4 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 18.02[1-2]; Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland,
Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 957-64 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J., commentary).
14. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 338 (1853).
15. "[l1t is the duty of courts and juries to look through the form for the substance of the
invention ...." Id. at 342-43.
16. Id. at 341-42.
17. Id.
18. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
19. See 2 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 8.02[2] (1989); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland,
Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 959 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J., commentary); Merrill v. Yeomans, 94
U.S. 568 (1877) (discussing the importance to the patent system of clear and precise claims).
20. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 959 (Newman, J., commentary). See also 4 D. CHISUM,
supra note 3, § 18.02[2].
21. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
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into a hollow and useless thing. Such a limitation would leave
room for-indeed encourage-the unscrupulous copyist to make
unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in the
patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough to take
the copied matter outside the reach of law. One who seeks to
pirate an invention, like one who seeks to pirate a copyrighted
book or play, may be expected to introduce minor variations to
conceal and shelter the piracy. Outright and forthright duplica-
tion is a dull and very rare form of infringement. To prohibit
no other would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and
would be subordinating substance to form. It would deprive him
of the benefit of his invention and would foster concealment
rather than disclosure of inventions, which is one of the primary
purposes of the patent system . 2
Although both Justice Black's and Justice Douglas' dissents in
Graver Tank argued that the prior art and the specification limited
the range of equivalents to which the claims could expand,"3 the
Graver Tank majority did not acknowledge any such limitations.
Graver Tank dealt solely with the factual, practical question of
equivalence in view of the technology and the prior art, and did not
consider prosecution history estoppel. The Graver Tank Court reit-
erated the classic statement of the doctrine of equivalents: the ac-
cused product is equivalent to the patented invention "if it performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to
achieve the same result." '24
II. DETERMINING EQUIVALENCE: THE FACTUAL LIMITS OF THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
The doctrine of equivalents is constrained by various "legal lim-
its," the prior art and prosecution history estoppel.2" However, fac-
tual limits also exist for the doctrine of equivalents. That is, the pat-
entee's claim of infringement might fail because the accused device
simply is not a practical equivalent of the patented invention under
the Graver Tank test. This section of the paper examines how the
Federal Circuit determines the factual limits of the doctrine of
equivalents. How does the court assess equivalence between the in-
22. Id.
23. Id. 616-18 (Black, Douglas, J.J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
25. The prior art and prosecution history estoppel are legal limits because the court
construes their effect as a question of law. For a discussion of these legal limits, see infra Part
III of this article.
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vention and accused device as a practical, technical matter? The
court's mode of analysis is of particular interest. Does the Federal
Circuit assess equivalence element by element or does it consider
only the claim as a whole? How do these two concepts differ?
A. Claim-as-a-Whole vs. Element-by-Element Analysis: Perkin-
Elmer, Hughes, Pennwalt
The Graver Tank "same-same-same" statement 26 expands a
patent claim to its broadest possible scope under the doctrine of
equivalents. Because the patent's prosecution history played no role
in Graver Tank, the claim in that case was extended to the full
range of what those skilled in the art would 'ecognize as practical
equivalents." The Supreme Court in Graver Tank stated that deter-
mining equivalence is a factual inquiry and advised courts to use
experts, texts and treatises, and prior art in determining equiva-
lence.28 But, Graver Tank did not advise courts whether the equiva-
lence determination is best undertaken by considering the claim "as a
whole," or by comparing the claim "element by element" with the
accused device. This issue sparked the Federal Circuit's quarrel in
Pennwalt.
But even before Pennwalt, the Federal Circuit signaled that a
conflict loomed in Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.29 Perkin-Elmer illustrates the factual limits of the doctrine of
equivalents (within the context of the "clearly erroneous" standard
of review imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP
52(a)). The district court in Perkin-Elmer found non-infringement
because the accused device differed in structure and operation from
two clauses of the claim (the interpretation of which was not dis-
26. See supra text accompanying note 24.
27. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609-11.
28. Id. at 609-10. See also Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931,
936-38 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (relying on expert testimony); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
717 F.2d 1351, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 1983). A useful guide in applying the Graver Tank test is
"whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of"
a part or parts of the accused device with the corresponding part or parts of the claimed device.
Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609; Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 553 F.2d 69, 82
(C.C.P.A. 1977). The question of equivalence is determined as of the time of the infringement.
Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
See also Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 776 F.2d 320, 326 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("'[A]n embel-
lishment' made possible by technological advances may not permit an accused device to escape
'the web of infringement.' "); Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1365.
29. 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987). As she later did in Pennwalt, Judge Newman
dissented in Perkin-Ehner and complained that the majority had ignored controlling precedent
by failing to consider the claim as a whole. Id. at 1535, 1536 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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puted). 0 The claim required "tap coupling" whereas the accused
device used "loop coupling." The trial court found that the two types
of coupling could not be equivalents, because they were substantially
different ways of achieving a common result."
Chief Judge Markey reviewed the trial court's findings and first
noted that equivalence is a finding of fact reviewable under the
"clearly erroneous" standard of FRCP 52(a). 2 The Federal Circuit
affirmed the finding of non-infringement because, even though the
claimed and accused devices possibly performed the same function to
achieve the same result, the lower court's finding that they did so in
substantially different ways was not clearly erroneous.33
Similar to Graver Tank, the claim in Perkin-Elmer was ex-
panded to its broadest possible scope. In Perkin-Elmer, as in Graver
Tank, the patent's prosecution history played no role in the court's
analysis of equivalents. However, unlike Graver Tank, Perkin-El-
mer did not result in a finding of infringement by equivalents. The
patent claim at issue in Perkin-Elmer, even given its most expansive
interpretation, could not encompass the accused device because of the
factual limits on the doctrine of equivalents.3 4
1. Perkin-Elmer Explained the Claim-as-a-Whole Statement
in Hughes
In finding those factual limits, the Perkin-Elmer court did not
place its primary emphasis on viewing the claim as a whole. In
Perkin-Elmer, the majority's analysis was limited to only two of the
ten elements of the claim.35 The Perkin-Elmer court so limited its
equivalence analysis even though the same judge, Chief Judge Mar-
key, previously ruled that the claim must be viewed "as a whole" in
determining equivalence.3 6 In Perkin-Elmer, Chief Judge Markey
noted that the statement in Hughes regarding analysis of the inven-
tion as a whole should not be construed as a directive for courts to
consider only the invention's "essence" and ignore claim limitations
in applying the doctrine of equivalents. 7
30. Id. at 1530.
31. Id. at 1529-35.
32. Id. at 1529.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1535.
35. Id. at 1530.
36. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983). After so
stating, the Hughes court nonetheless proceeded to apply the doctrine of equivalents element by
element, paying attention to the role of each element within the claim. Id. at 1363-66.
37. Perkin-Ehner, 822 F.2d at 1532-33 n.8.
19891
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The Perkin-Elmer court acknowledged statements in other cases
concerning the appropriateness of considering the "essence," the
'"gist," or the "heart" of the invention in applying the doctrine of
equivalents, 8 citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd.," Atlas Powder
Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,40 and Medtronic, Inc. v.
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc.41 Nevertheless, in Perkin-Elmer, Chief
Judge Markey characterized those statements as dicta, and reempha-
sized that claim limitations are not to be regarded as immaterial or
38. Viewing the claim as a whole and considering the heart of the invention are distinct
and opposing concepts. See, e.g., Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (In determining 35 U.S.C. § 103 non-obviousness, there is no legally proteciable
"essence" of the invention; rather, the court must consider the claim in its entirety, or as a
whole.). Considering the heart of the invention is an outdated and obsolete way to identify and
define intellectual property. See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931,
957-59 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J., commentary) (discussing the historical transition from
core claiming to perimeter claiming: "patent claims no longer merely claim the salient features,
the 'heart' of the invention"). See generally 2 D. CHISUM, supra note 19, § 8.0211-3] (discuss-
ing historical development of patent claims).
The "heart of the invention" concept grows out of the "equitable" nature of the doctrine
of equivalents. Graver Tank emphasized that the doctrine is an important tool for patentees to
prevent infringers from stealing the "benefit" of the invention. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1950). Other older cases refer to the "substance"
of the invention. See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 229 (1853); Burr v.
Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531 (1864).
Similarly, courts have in the past held that the patentee must lay some equitable founda-
tion-for example, the patent covers a pioneer invention or defendant has stolen the heart of
the invention-before the doctrine of equivalents can be applied. See, e.g., In re Certain Steel
Toy Vehicles, 197 U.S.P.Q. 873, 883-84 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Cf Coleco Indus., Inc. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 573 F.2d 1247, 1258 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (Rich, J., joined by Mar-
key, C.J., concurring) ("The doctrine [of equivalents] is an exception to the rule that patentees
are limited to what they claim and is not applied in every case.").
Even though Graver Tank implied that the doctrine of equivalents is merely a shield
protecting patentees from shrewd technology thieves, the doctrine has evolved as much more
than that. Graver Tank's discourse on the evils of the "unscrupulous copyist" is really a warn-
ing of what would happen if we did not have the doctrine of equivalents, not a rule that the
doctrine may only be applied against pirates-willful infringers. The practice today is to fol-
low the majority in Coleco and apply the doctrine of equivalents routinely after finding no
literal infringement. The patentee need not lay any equitable foundation to expand the claim
through the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1361, 1363, where even
though the court acknowledged the doctrine's equitable character, it did not require the paten-
tee to lay an equitable foundation to justify invoking the doctrine. Thus the "heart," .essence,"
and "gist" of the invention are concepts of "equity" relating to a discarded view of the doctrine
of equivalents; as such, they are no longer useful in analyzing doctrine of equivalents issues.
39. 781 F.2d 861, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
40. 750 F.2d 1569, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
41. 721 F.2d 1563, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See also Coleco Indus., 573 F.2d at 1258
(Rich, J., joined by Markey, C.J., concurring, but disagreeing with the majority's use of the
doctrine of equivalents: "[N]o basis has been laid for [the doctrine's] application by showing,
for example, . . . that appellees have appropriated the essence of the invention." (emphasis in
original)).
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insignificant in determining infringement."3 Thus, Perkin-Elmer,
written by the same judge who wrote Hughes, explained that under
Hughes, the court may compare the claim with the accused device
"element by element," but also must view each claim limitation in
the context of the entire claim.4
2. The Perkin-Elmer Dissent and the "Heart" of the
Invention: Obsolete Ways of Defining the Scope of Patent Protection
Judge Newman's dissent in Perkin-Elmer was an early sign of
the storm clouds gathering in the Federal Circuit that would erupt
in the Pennwalt decision. Judge Newman criticized the majority's
focus on only two specific claim elements rather than the invention
as a whole. Judge Newman called the majority's consideration of
only two of the ten elements "improper claim analysis.""" Judge
Newman also accused the majority of rewriting Hughes according to
how they would prefer to have written it,4" and of categorizing, in
footnote 8, "much of [the Federal Circuit's] jurisprudence as
'dicta.' "46
Admittedly, regarding the technical "tap coupling/loop coup-
ling" issue in Perkin-Elmer, Judge Newman might have the better
of the argument. But Judge Newman's legal arguments regarding
the doctrine of equivalents are conclusory, unsupported and unsup-
portable for at least three reasons. First, the statements distinguished
by the Perkin-Elmer majority as dicta (the statements from Loctite,
Atlas Powder, and Medtronic) are references to an obsolete con-
42. Perkin-Eliner, 822 F.2d at 1532-33 n.8. Accord Lemelson v. United States, 752
F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that "[i]t is . . . well settled that each element of a
claim is material and essential, and that in order for a court to find infringement, the plaintiff
must show the presence of every element or its substantial equivalent in the accused device").
In Lenelson, which was decided after Hughes, and in fact cites Hughes, the accused device
lacked the single claim element of "manipulation means" or its equivalent. Based solely on this
finding, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of non-infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1551.
43. Perkin-Elmer, 822 F.2d at 1532-35 nn.3-5. In assessing equivalence, the court
should consider the purpose the limitation serves within the patent, its characteristics when
combined with the other elements or limitations of the claim, and the intended functions of the
element or limitation. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S.
605, 609 (stating that the court must consider an ingredient's purpose, qualities, and function
in the patent).
44. Perkin-Elner, 822 F.2d at 1539 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1983), and Martin v. Barber, 755 F.2d
1564, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
45. Id. at 1536. This complaint is somewhat curious considering that both Hughes and
Perkin-Elner were written by the same judge, Chief Judge Markey.
46. Id. at 1544.
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cept,47 and are, in fact, dicta.48 Consider the context in which the
statements were made. In both Medtronic and Loctite, the court dis-
cussed both the doctrines of equivalents and obviousness under 35
U.S.C. § 103, and stated that there is no legally recognizable "es-
sence," "heart," or "gist" of the invention; rather, the invention must
be considered "as a whole."'49 In Atlas Powder, the Federal Circuit,
noting that the district court had considered the heart of the inven-
tion merely as a supplement to its Graver Tank analysis, simply
mentioned that the heart-of-the-invention analysis did no real
harm. 0 In none of these three cases did the court rely on its heart-
of-the-invention analysis for the holding.
Second, Martin v. Barber,1 cited in Judge Newman's dissent,
does not support the "claim as a whole" argument. To the contrary,
Martin stated that where an element is changed to avoid infringe-
ment, "it is appropriate to consider, in assessing equivalence,
whether the changed element operates in substantially the same way
as the claimed element . .. 5.
Third, in addition to its two-element approach the Perkin-El-
47. See supra note 38.
48. More troublesome than any of these three statements is a different statement in
Loctite, neither distinguished by the majority nor cited by the dissent in Perkin-Elmer, that the
prosecution history would not necessarily prevent the district court from assessing equivalence
on remand, in part "because [defendant] may be using the most important aspect if not the gist
of [plaintiff's] inventions." Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 871 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(emphasis added).
That statement is best explained by observing that in Loctite, the finding that the defend-
ant had taken the "gist" of the invention simply meant that a finding of infringement by
equivalence would be appropriate. Loctite did not say that the defendant's taking of the "gist"
of the invention would mandate a finding of infringement by equivalence. Nor did it say that
such a finding is a prerequisite to applying the doctrine.
The "heart" of the invention has been defined as the "crucial teaching" of the patent. See
Weidman Metal Masters v. Glass Master Corp., 623 F.2d 1024, 1030 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 982 (1981). In the context of the claim, the "heart" or "essence" or "gist"
thus can be thought of as the key element or characteristic that makes the invention different
from all that was known before it. Whatever else taking the "heart" of the invention means, a
defendant does not infringe by taking the "heart" of the claimed invention without taking the
other elements or their equivalent. Perkin-Elner, 822 F.2d at 1532-33 n.8.
49. Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Loctite, 781 F.2d at 872. In Medtronic, Chief Judge Markey stated that it is appropriate to
consider the heart of the invention in applying the doctrine of equivalents. Medtronic, 721
F.2d at 1567. And previously in Hughes, the same judge wrote that it is error not to consider
the invention as a whole in assessing equivalence. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1364. Combining Med-
tronic and Hughes, it is permissible to consider the "heart" of the claim, and it is mandatory
to view the "claim as a whole" under the doctrine of equivalents.
50. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1582 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
51. 755 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
52. Id. at 1564, 1568 (emphasis added).
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mer majority did, in fact, consider the claim as a whole." In Perkin-
Elner, the court justified its focus on only two claim elements by
pointing out that those two claim elements were sufficiently different
from the corresponding elements of the accused devices to prevent the
accused devices, "as wholes," from operating in substantially the
same way as the claimed devices-"as wholes.' "
Indeed, it is not at all unusual for the court to focus on only one
or two elements of the claim in assessing equivalence. In Atlas Pow-
der, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's doctrine of
equivalents analysis, even though the district court focused on only
one claim element and the single corresponding ingredient in the ac-
cused composition to determine equivalence.55
Similarly in Lemelson, the Federal Circuit, in affirming the dis-
trict court's finding of non-infringement, focused the equivalence
analysis on only one element of the claim.5 The question of in-
fringement by equivalence almost invariably boils down to whether
some aspect of the accused device is a substantial equivalent of the
corresponding limitation or limitations of the claim. There is no ra-
tional way to determine equivalence other than with respect to spe-
cific claim limitations.
3. Hughes' Claim-as-a-Whole Concept Refined: Pennwalt v.
Durand-Wayland
The Federal Circuit's brewing controversy over element-by-ele-
ment analysis under the doctrine of equivalents peaked in Pennwalt
v. Durand-Wayland, Inc. 7 The dissent in Pennwalt equated ele-
ment-by-element analysis with requiring one-to-one correspondence
between claim elements and corresponding elements of the accused
device. 8 That is not a fair reading of the majority opinion in
Pennwalt.
The Pennwalt court approved the lower court's element- by-
element analytic structure.5 ' But the Pennwalt court did not hold
that it is proper to ignore the context of each claim limitation. And
53. Perkin-Elmer, 822 F.2d at 1528. Perhaps, then, element-by-element analysis is per-
fectly compatible with claim-as-a-whole analysis.
54. Id. at 1530 n.5. (emphasis added).
55. Atlas Powder, 750 F.2d at 1579-80, aff g 588 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D. Tex. 1983)
(restricting analysis under doctrine of equivalents to the "one point of difference between the
claims of the Bluhm patent and the Du Pont product. ... )
56. Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1549-51 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
57. 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en bane).
58. Id. at 946 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 935.
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nowhere did the court state that a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween claim limitations and elements of the accused device is re-
quired to find infringement. In fact, considering Martin v. Barber
(analysis limited to one element),60 Atlas Powder (analysis limited to
one element),61 Hughes (de facto comparison between claim and ac-
cused device element by element),62 and Perkin-Elmer (analysis lim-
ited to two of ten elements),6" Pennwalt's approval of an element-by-
element analysis under the doctrine of equivalents is hardly remark-
able. Furthermore, the concept of viewing the claim as a whole, inso-
far as it means assessing each limitation in the context of the entire
claim, is entirely consistent with an element-by-element analytic
structure.64
The dissents in Pennwalt characterized the majority's opinion
as inconsistent with the claim-as-a-whole rule of Hughes.6 Judge
Newman said that the case was "factually on all fours" with
Hughes,6 yet the majority reached a different result than that of
Hughes-affirmance of the finding of non-infringement.
Did Pennwalt overrule Hughes "sub silentio," as the dissent
60. 755 F.2d 1564, 1566-68 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
61. 750 F.2d 1569, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
62. 717 F.2d 1351, 1364-66 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
63. 822 F.2d 1528, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
64. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1363-66. The apocalyptic tone of the dissents in Perkin-Elmer
and Pennualt suggests that such imprecise formulations as "heart of the invention" and "view
the claim as a whole" are not useful for rational and consistent legal analysis. Moreover,
considering that often millions of dollars are at stake, and sometimes the very existence of a
company employing hundreds (or thousands) of people is in jeopardy, the court perhaps should
struggle to develop some mode of analysis more usable and precise than "view the claim as a
whole."
As Learned Hand said of the classical statement of the doctrine: "The usual ritual, which
is so often repeated and which has so little meaning . . . does not help much in application; it
is no more than a way of stating the problem." Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. E. Machett &
Sons, 3 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 220, 222 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 741 (1930). The
courts have justified the lack of usable guidelines for applying the doctrine by stating that it is
an equitable doctrine, and to constrain it with rigid rules of application would compromise the
court's equitable powers. But that justification evaporates when we consider that the Federal
Circuit never applies the doctrine of equivalents by weighing the equities as it does, for exam-
ple, in considering a preliminary injunction. And rightly so, for patent protection should not
depend on something as irrelevant to an invention's breadth and as completely unpredictable as
the equitable status of potential infringers. The doctrine of equivalents has for too long re-
mained vague and imprecise. The Federal Circuit should be commended for attempting at
least to set up a definite and consistent analytical structure that is useful in applying the
doctrine.
65. Pennu'alt, 833 F.2d at 941 (Bennett, J., dissenting, joined by Cowen, Smith and
Newman, J.J.: "Hughes . . . is clearly being overruled by the majority. ), and at 955
(Newman, J., commentary).
66. Id. at 955 (Newman, J., commentary).
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claims?67 The answer is "no." Admittedly, the two cases share some
similarities. In Pennwalt, the accused device lacked a single claimed
element: "position indicating means." 8 The prior art cited during
prosecution likewise lacked such a means.69 Similarly in Hughes, the
cited prior art and the accused devices both lacked a claim limitation:
means for sending the satellite's spatial orientation data to an exter-
nal location.7 ' Despite the similarities, the two cases reach opposite
results.
The divergence between Pennwalt and Hughes is at least partly
attributable to the different standards of review that apply to differ-
ent district court determinations. In Hughes, the Federal Circuit de-
cided as a matter of law that the trial court's "single conclusory par-
agraph" addressing equivalence failed to meet the legal requirements
for a doctrine of equivalents analysis. 7' The Federal Circuit listed
several reasons for this decision: (1) the trial judge's demand for
"obvious and exact" equivalents was error because such a require-
ment would emasculate the doctrine of equivalents; (2) the trial
judge did not define "obvious or exact equivalent"; (3) the trial
judge did not supply reasoned analysis to support the conclusion that
the accused devices lacked obvious or exact equivalents of the perti-
nent elements; (4) the trial judge did not apply the "same-same-
same" test of Graver Tank; and (5) the trial judge failed to apply
the doctrine of equivalents to the claimed invention as a whole.7 2
Significantly, the Hughes court did not reject the trial judge's
finding of non-equivalence as clearly erroneous, the standard for re-
viewing factual findings on equivalence.7" Rather, the Hughes court
held that the trial judge's doctrine of equivalents analysis was legally
insufficient because the judge, by interpreting the prosecution history
as requiring "obvious and exact equivalents," applied an improper
standard for determining equivalence.74
The Federal Circuit in Pennwalt, on the other hand, found no
such deficiencies in the district court's analysis. The court approved
67. Id. at 939-54 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 938.
69. Id. at 936-39.
70. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1352-56, 1361.
71. Id. at 1363-65.
72. Id. at 1363-64.
73. Id. at 1363-65.
74. Id. At that point, the Federal Circuit could have remanded the case with instruc-
tions to apply the correct standard in assessing equivalence. But apparently the court was
confident in its ability to undertake the factual determination of equivalence based on the
record before it.
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of the district court's doctrine of equivalents analysis. 5 Indeed, the
trial judge in Pennwalt, unlike the trial judge in Hughes, analyzed
equivalence extensively.76
The Federal Circuit in Pennwalt, having found the trial court's
equivalence analysis legally sound, limited its review to the factual
question of infringement-both literal and by equivalents-under
the "clearly erroneous" standard of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 52(a)." In contrast, the Hughes court, finding legal error in
the trial judge's equivalence analysis, made its own factual determi-
nation of equivalence based on inferences from the record on appeal
and reached a different factual conclusion.7
B. The Modern Trend: Away From the Equities
Hughes and Pennwalt are not in irreconcilable conflict, and as
observed earlier, claim-as-a-whole and element-by-element analyses
are compatible. Both are concepts that move away from the obsolete
"heart" of the invention idea.
The "equitable" nature of the doctrine of equivalents has been
overplayed, and it has a decidedly hollow ring. Such was the case in
Graver Tank, and it is still true. Unlike cases finding no infringe-
ment, but characteristic of cases finding infringement by equivalence,
Graver Tank emphasized the "equitable" nature of the doctrine of
equivalents.79 The Graver Tank Court stated that the doctrine of
equivalents evolved in response to the tendency of technology pirates
to conceal their thievery by making superficial changes to their copy
of an invention.80 Indeed, to justify its invocation of the doctrine of
75. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934-39.
76. Compare Pennwalt, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 558, 568-72 (N.D. Ga. 1984) ("Neither
the language of the claims of the patent nor the prior art require that the claims of the patent-
in-suit be read to include only those devices that use the components described in the patent-
in-suit's claims and specification.") with Hughes, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 787, 810-12 (Ct. Cl.
Tr. Div. 1982) (requiring "obvious and exact equivalents" because "file wrapper estoppel acts
to severely limit the range of equivalents to which a claim is entitled").
77. PennwalIt, 833 F.2d at 936.
78. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1364-66. Had the trial court in Hughes provided an adequate
factual analysis of equivalence, the Federal Circuit could, and presumably would, have re-
viewed the trial court's findings on equivalence under the clearly erroneous standard, as it did
in Pennwalt.
In both Hughes and Pennwalt, the Federal Circuit nevertheless undertook an indepen-
dent de novo review of the patent-in-suit's prosecution history. See Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1352-
54, 1361-63; Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 937-39. Therefore, the Hughes court would have reversed
anyway because of its disagreement with the trial judge on the impact of the prosecution
history.
79. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-10 (1950).
80. Id. at 607-08.
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equivalents, the Court relied heavily on the defendant's apparent sta-
tus as an "unscrupulous copyist" 81-a factor that is completely irrel-
evant to determining patent infringement.8"
Of what significance is the Graver Tank Court's portrayal of
the doctrine of equivalents as a rule of equity protecting patentees
from "pirates"? Why did the Court emphasize that the defendant
developed its product by copying the plaintiff's invention? Perhaps
the Court meant to imply that the doctrine of equivalents should be
reserved only for cases of willful infringement, i.e., where the de-
fendant is a pirate. If that is the case, then nobody has taken the
Court's advice seriously.8 Whatever the meaning of those parts of
the Graver Tank opinion, the Court overshadowed that meaning by
extolling the goodness of the doctrine so eloquently throughout the
rest the Graver Tank opinion. At least one of Justice Black's predic-
tions in dissent was accurate: "One need not be a prophet to suggest
that today's rhapsody on the virtue of the 'doctrine of equivalents'
will . . .make enlargement of patent claims the 'rule' rather than
the 'exception.' "84
That is not to suggest that the courts' present practice is bad; all
patented inventions should be entitled to a fair range of equivalents
no matter how culpable the accused infringer. The doctrine of
equivalents may be an equitable doctrine, but its application is not
controlled by the equities of each case. Consider the patentee con-
fronting two infringers, A and B, whose products are identical and
are equivalents of the claimed invention. Infringer A has deliberately
stolen the essence of the invention and has made superficial changes
to avoid liability. Infringer B, on the other hand, spent much time
and money to devise its product independently. B is an "innocent"
infringer; A is a "pirate."
In the ensuing lawsuit for patent infringement, if we adhere
strictly to the rule that the doctrine "exists solely for the equitable
purpose of 'prevent[ing] an infringer from stealing the benefit of an
invention,' "85 we readily hold A liable for infringement by
81. Id.
82. See 4 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 18.02[2) (criticizing Graver Tank's reliance on
the defendant's imitation of the invention: "One of the major purposes of the patent system is
to provide disclosure of technological information for use by the public"), § 16.02[2] (knowl-
edge and intent are not relevant to determining direct infringement). See also supra note 38.
83. See supra note 38.
84. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 616 (Black, J., dissenting). That is, courts assess in-
fringement by equivalence now as a routine step in patent infringement cases. See supra note
28.
85. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. International Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1572
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equivalents. The equitable considerations are obvious. But what
about B? The equities really seem to favor B, the innocent infringer.
Applying the doctrine of equivalents to hold B liable would not pre-
vent an infringer from stealing; it would punish an innocent party
whose hard work and financial investment unfortunately happened
to yield an infringing product. Balancing the equities, B would not
be liable.
Such a result is absurd and unfair to patentees; the inventor has
a statutory right to exclude all others from making, using, or selling
what the inventor has discovered. Every inventor is entitled to a fair,
common-sense assessment of the invention's scope as determined pri-
marily by the claims and the prior art.
Inventors should be able to use the doctrine of equivalents to
expand constrained, literal claim language into a more common-
sense definition of the scope of protection because of the nature of
inventions and intellectual property. Inventions are, by definition,
something "new under the sun," and intellectual property is an in-
tangible and elusive concept. Volumes could be written to describe
and define a single invention and its intellectual property content.86
But to make the patent system workable, the invention and its intel-
lectual property boundaries must be defined in a single sentence: the
claim. The claim makes the patent system workable, but it is inher-
ently inadequate for its function and presents somewhat of a hard-
ship to inventors.87 The doctrine of equivalents balances this hard-
ship. To treat the doctrine as a truly equitable tool, and thus make
its availability depend on the equities of individual cases, would be
unfair to patentees. For the doctrine of equivalents really to be an
"equitable" doctrine, it should not be applied according to individual
equities. Rather, the doctrine of equivalents should be available to all
patentees.
This conclusion means that the Federal Circuit no longer can
decline to enunciate usable guidelines for applying the doctrine. The
court cannot brush off its responsibility to make rules of patent law
by referring to the doctrine of equivalents' equitable nature, quoting
a few lines from Graver Tank, and announcing its decision. The
court must guide lower courts, businessmen, and lawyers in applying
the doctrine of equivalents. Perhaps Pennwalt signals the Federal
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (quoting Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608). Statements in this vein are standard
boilerplate for Federal Circuit decisions on the doctrine of equivalents.
86. Indeed, some patents, coupled with their prosecution history, are quite voluminous.




Circuit's willingness to move in this direction.
As the Federal Circuit discovers that the doctrine of equivalents
is an anomaly, an "equitable doctrine" unguided by equities, it can
begin to set up some definite analytical framework through which
the courts can apply the doctrine consistently. Thus, the doctrine
evolves as a common-sense tool of claim construction. The doctrine of
equivalents gives full patent protection to all patentees, not just those
with the equities on their side.
II. PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL
Although not at issue in Graver Tank, the prior art and the
prosecution history, both applied as questions of law, can impose
limits on the broad claim scope available under the Graver Tank
formulation.8" By definition, a patent claim cannot cover subject
matter in the prior art. Similarly, if a patentee has obtained patent
protection by stating that a patent claim does not cover subject mat-
ter X, then the claim cannot cover X, even if X and the invention are
plainly "equivalent" from the perspective of the person of ordinary
skill in the art. These are the legal limits imposed on the doctrine of
equivalents.
A. Prosecution History Estoppel Is Not a Bar to the Doctrine of
Equivalents
The prosecution history affects claim scope in two ways. First,
it aids the court in construing the claims before determining literal
infringement, and second, by yielding prosecution history estoppels,
it limits the doctrine of equivalents after the court finds no literal
infringement.8"
As a practical matter, one may question whether such a distinc-
tion is necessary. After all, why not simply analyze the prosecution
history once and be done with it? The issue was decided in Coleco
Industries v. United States International Trade Commission,"
where the majority held that upon a finding of no literal infringe-
ment, the court should apply the doctrine of equivalents as a matter
88. See Loctite Corp. v. Ultra Seal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870-71 & n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
89. Id. at 870. See also Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1571(Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that prosecution history estoppel is not relevant if there is literal
infringement, but acknowledging that the prosecution history is relevant to the task of constru-
ing the claims before analyzing literal infringement).
90. 573 F.2d 1247 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
1989]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
of course, construing the claims in view of the specification. 9' Then,
if the three-prong test of Graver Tank establishes equivalency as a
technical matter, the prosecution history is analyzed for estoppel.92
That is exactly what the Coleco majority did. After finding the
accused device to be equivalent under the Graver Tank test, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Coleco applied prosecution
history estoppel to limit the range of equivalents and affirmed the
finding of non-infringement.93 Judge Rich, joined by Chief Judge
Markey, concurred in the result but scoffed at the majority's "ex-
pand-then-contract" method of reaching that result:
If a patentee is estopped by his prosecution history to assert that
a claim is broad enough to be infringed by an accused structure
• ..it is wasted motion, if not an absurdity, to first apply the
doctrine of equivalents to expand the claim 'beyond its literal
confines' to cover the structure and in the next breath contract it
to its original literal scope. 9'
Possibly Judge Rich's position makes sense given the particular
facts of Coleco, where, according to Judge Rich, the question of in-
fringement was "clear as day,"95 and to suggest even the possibility
of equivalence between the invention and the accused device would
be "utterly absurd."' But many, if not most cases present very close
issues of infringement, especially infringement by equivalents. Ordi-
narily the trial court should not allow the prosecution history to pre-
vent the court from conducting a thorough factual assessment of
equivalence upon finding no literal infringement. Although the pros-
ecution history may operate to limit the range of equivalents to
which a claim is entitled, "it is not fatal to application of the doctrine
[of equivalents] itself."'97
The analytical process used by the majority in Coleco makes
sense. It makes sense because the appellate court is always free to
substitute its own interpretation of the prosecution history for that of
91. Id. at 1253-54.
92. Id. & n.6.
93. Id. at 1255-58.
94. Id. at 1259 (Rich, J., concurring).
95. Id.
96. Id. See also Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452-53,
455 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Rich, J., affirming) (holding no infringement and omitting any consid-
eration of equivalence where the charge of infringement arguably is "baseless").
97. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See
also Hi-Life Prods., Inc. v..American Nat'l Water-Mattress Corp., 842 F.2d 323, 326 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (remanding for a determination of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
because the lower court omitted any such determination).
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the trial court. When the appellate court does so, the trial court faces
an increased possibility that the appellate court will disagree with
the legal standard used by the trial court and remand the case for the
trial court to consider equivalence under a "correct" legal standard.
The trial court can reduce this possibility by providing the appellate
court with a thorough factual assessment of equivalence on the rec-
ord. If the trial court has assessed equivalence thoroughly, there is
no need for a remand because the appellate court itself can apply the
proper legal standard to facts already in the record.98 In this man-
ner, the courts achieve a measure of judicial economy: the appellate
court applies its own interpretation of the prosecution history to the
facts at hand and decides the case right then and there, rather than
remanding the case or attempting to find facts itself at the appellate
court level.99 That is probably one reason why in many cases the
trial court does assess equivalents as a matter of course after finding
no literal infringement.
B. The Claim-Limiting Effect of Prosecution History Estoppel: The
Recent Trend
Prosecution history estoppel applies both to amendments made
to overcome the prior art and to arguments made to obtain the pat-
ent.'00 But not all amendments and arguments create estoppels.' 0 '
Judge Kashiwa has provided a concise statement of the nature of
prosecution history estoppel:
[W]henever the doctrine of file history estoppel is invoked, a
close examination must be made as to, not only what was sur-
rendered, but also the reason for such a surrender. The fact that
claims were narrowed does not always mean that the doctrine of
file history estoppel completely prohibits a patentee from recap-
turing some of what was originally claimed."a
98. This is exactly what the Federal Circuit attempted to do in Hughes, but the panel
deciding Hughes could not agree on how to apply the correct legal standard because the factual
record on equivalence was lacking.
99. True, the Hughes court saw fit to evaluate expert testimony, 717 F.2d at 1364-65,
and to make the factual determination of equivalence in that case, but it is equally true that
fact-finding in appellate courts is unreliable, and is also poor policy. Indeed, one of the bases
for Judge Davis' dissent in Hughes was his disagreement with the majority's factual assess-
ment of equivalence. Id. at 1367 & n.2 (Davis, J., dissenting) (quarreling with the majority's
evaluation of the expert testimony).
100. Id. at 1362-63.
101. Id.
102. Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar Int'l Research B.V., 738 F.2d 1237, 1243
(Fed. Cir. 1984). See also Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1363 ("Depending on :he nature and purpose
of an amendment, it may have a limiting effect within a spectrum ranging from great to small
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Thus, the rules defining the impact of various statements made dur-
ing prosecution are not susceptible to broad generalizations; rather,
they are best illustrated through examples. The examples show that
prosecution history estoppel is losing its potency as a defensive,
claim-limiting weapon for accused infringers.
The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel does not necessarily
limit the patentee to the literal meaning of claim elements added by
amendment-even an amendment necessary to distinguish cited prior
art.10 3 The patent in Hughes related to attitude control of a satellite.
The patentee invented and claimed a satellite capable of achieving a
fixed attitude, or spatial orientation, with respect to a fixed point on
earth. During prosecution, the examiner rejected the claims, based in
part on the McLean patent. McLean disclosed a self-contained, self-
guiding space vehicle for steering on a collision course with a moving
target.
Williams (the patentee in Hughes) re-wrote the claims to distin-
guish over McLean. The claims, as re-written, differed from Mc-
Lean's device in basically two respects. First, the re-written claims
required that the attitude information be sent to an external location,
processed, and returned to the satellite as "real-time" control signals
(i.e., command signals that are executed immediately). 04 In contrast,
McLean's device was self-contained. Second, the re-written claims
required that the satellite attitude data be computed "with reference
to a fixed external coordinate system" whereas McLean's device
tracked a moving target by hitting the target with an infrared beam
and detecting the reflection.'0 5 In his argument to the examiner,
Williams emphasized that the cited McLean reference did not indi-
cate satellite attitude " 'with reference to a fixed external coordinate
system,' " and the re-written claims were allowed.""
The accused devices in Hughes featured an on-board computer
that stores the control signals for later, properly-timed execution in-
stead of the claimed invention's ground-based computer that trans-
mits the control signals, at the proper time, for immediate execution.
But the accused devices did indicate satellite attitude with reference
to a fixed external coordinate system, as required in the claim.1°
In Hughes, the argument for prosecution history estoppel was
to zero.").
103. Id. at 1362-63.
104. Id. at 1355-56.
105. Id.
106. Id. (emphasis in original).
107. Id. at 1363-66.
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clear: The "external-location" feature had been added to the claims
by amendment and to overcome prior art.'" 8 The prior art devices
did not transmit the satellite attitude data to an external location,
and neither did the accused satellites. Even so, the Hughes court ex-
tended the claims to cover the accused satellites.
Did the Hughes court simply overlook the external-location fea-
ture? No, but the Federal Circuit in Hughes did not regard the fea-
ture of sending the data to an external location as critical to distin-
guishing the claim over the prior art. In arguing to distinguish the
cited references during prosecution, Williams emphasized that the
claimed invention computed the orientation data relative to a fixed
external coordinate system. Apparently, Williams did not argue that
the claimed invention was patentable because it transmitted data to
an external location. Because the patentee (1) did not base an argu-
ment for patentability on the external-location feature, and (2) spe-
cifically did base the argument for patentability on a different fea-
ture, added to the claim contemporaneously with the external-
location feature, the claim was entitled to a range of equivalents with
respect to the exter.ial-location feature." 9
Under Hughes, courts must analyze prosecution history estoppel
with a focus on determining not only what the patentee argued, but
also what was actually needed to establish patentability. Neverthe-
less, prosecution history estoppel requires the patentee to rely on
what was actually said and done during prosecution, not on what
could have been said or done, to obtain the patent." 0
For example, in Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co.,"' the prosecution
history of the litigated patent was similar to that of the Williams
patent in Hughes. However, the Kinzenbaw court rejected the same
argument that it had accepted in Hughes: that the claim should be
entitled to a range of equivalents with respect to one of two claim
limitations added to overcome a prior art rejection because that limi-
tation was not necessary to establish patentability." 2 In Kinzenbaw,
as in Hughes, the patentee added two claim limitations, by amend-
108. Id. at 1355-56, 1363.
109. Id. at 1355-56.
110. If the estoppel operates only to prevent the claim from extending to cover the prior
art references upon which the examiner based the rejection, then it is no estoppel at all because
the claim can never be extended to cover the prior art, regardless of amendments and argu-
ments during prosecution. See 4 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 18.0513] ("This position is
clearly too lenient for it would extend file wrapper estoppel only into an area where it is not
needed.").
111. 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
112. Id. at 389.
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ment, to overcome prior art cited by the PTO Examiner. Further, in
Kinzenbaw, as in Hughes, the court acknowledged that one of the
added limitations was not necessary to establish patentability. The
accused device in Kinzenbaw, like the accused device in Hughes,
lacked only the limitation that was added unnecessarily.113 Neverthe-
less, in Kinzenbaw, contrary to the decision in Hughes, the Federal
Circuit refused to allow the claim to cover the accused device
through the doctrine of equivalents.11' The court supported its deci-
sion by stating:
We decline to undertake the speculative inquiry whether, if
Pust had made only that narrowing limitation in his claim, the
examiner nevertheless would have allowed it. The file on Pust's
patent, to which the public had access, explicitly showed that in
response to the examiner's rejection, Pust had narrowed hi
claims to a planter in which "the radius of the wheel . . . [is]
less than the radius of the disc." Deere offers no convincing rea-
son why a competing manufacturer was not justified in assum-
ing that if he built a planter in which the radius of the wheels
was greater than that of the disc, he would not infringe the Pust
patent."'
Despite the apparent conflict between Hughes and Kinzenbaw,
the two cases can be reconciled. During the prosecution of the patent
in Hughes, the patentee (then applicant) not only added the relevant
claim limitations, but also filed written remarks accompanying the
amendment and emphasizing one of the added limitations. In con-
trast, the patentee in Kinzenbaw added the limitations after an inter-
view with the examiner. 16
Perhaps the Kinzenbaw court could have determined, based on
its own independent assessment of the cited prior art, that one of the
features added to the claims during prosecution was unnecessary.
But the court apparently could point to nothing included in the pat-
entee's prosecution history that would lead a person studying that
prosecution history to that conclusion. Therefore, the Kinzenbaw
court declined to insert its own conclusion as to whether the added
limitation was necessary where the patentee had provided no support
113. Id. at 388-89 ("Some evidence supports [plaintiff] Deere's contention that the size
of the gauge wheel is irrelevant and that [defendant Kinzenbaw's] larger gauge wheel is
equivalent to [plaintiff Deere's] smaller gauge wheel.").
114. Id. at 389.
115. Id.
116. See Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1354-56; Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 388.
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for such a conclusion.1 1 7
In Kinzenbaw, the court narrowed the litigated claims because
of a lack of remarks accompanying the amendment. 18 The court rec-
ord contained nothing to indicate which new claim limitations distin-
guished the cited prior art. The lack of such accompanying remarks,
however, did not have a narrowing effect in Hi-Life,1 9 where, just
as in Kinzenbaw, the patentee amended the claim as suggested by
the examiner in a telephone interview. In Hi-Life, the trial court
held that, because of the patentee's amendment, prosecution history
estoppel foreclosed any resort to the doctrine of equivalents. 20 The
Federal Circuit remanded the case for findings on equivalents, be-
cause, based on the court's view of the prosecution, the added limita-
tion was not necessary to avoid prior art.1 The court reached this
conclusion even though during prosecution of the patent in Hi-Life
the examiner had noted that the added limitation " 'is not taught by
the prior art and renders the claims patentable.' "22
The claimed invention in Hi-Life was a waterbed mattress con-
taining a floating wave dampener made from an insert of open-cell
foam. The wave dampener floated by virtue of a material of low
specific gravity disposed throughout the dampener's body. The prior
art cited by the examiner included a reference that taught disposing
a lightweight material in foam, but the reference did not disclose that
teaching in combination with a waterbed. The amendment added the
following language: "a material of low specific gravity disposed
throughout its body, said material of low specific gravity causing the
foam to float in the liquid, above the bottom wall of the container,
close to the top wall of the container. "123
The accused waterbed mattress in Hi-Lfe included both the
foam insert and the low-specific-gravity material, but instead of hav-
ing the low-specific-gravity material "disposed throughout" the
foam, as in the claim, the accused device featured the low-specific-
117. Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 388-89. The court did not want to require that others be
able to read things in the prosecution that were not provided by the patentee: "Deere offers no
convincing reason why a competing manufacturer was not justified in assuming that if he built
a planter in which the radius of the wheels was greater than that of the disc, he would not
infringe [Deere's] patent." Id. at 389. Accord Prodyne Enters., Inc. v. Julie Pomerantz, Inc.,
743 F.2d 1581, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting Kinzenbaw).
118. Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 388-89.
119. Hi-Life Prods. v. American Nat'l Water-Mattress Corp., 842 F.2d 323 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
120. Id. at 325.
121. Id. at 326.
122. Id. (Davis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 325-26.
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gravity material attached as a sheet to the bottom of the foam insert.
The cited prior art did not disclose a waterbed mattress containing a
foam wave dampener to which a sheet of low-specific-gravity mate-
rial was attached, and neither the patentee nor the examiner had
referred to such a configuration during prosecution.124
Further, the patentee did not argue that the invention was pat-
entable because it featured low-specific-gravity material "disposed
throughout," rather than attached to, the foam insert. Thus, the
prosecution history did not address the question of whether the
claims could extend to cover configurations such as the accused
device." '
Coupled with related cases, the Hi-Life decision shows that the
Federal Circuit has elected to neutralize prosecution history estoppel.
In recent decisions such as Loctite and Hi-Life, the court has given
prosecution history estoppel little more claim-limiting effect than
that already provided by the cited prior art.1 6 Corning Glass Works
v. Sumitomo Electric USA, Inc. 2 7 is an exceptional example of this
trend. The claim in Corning defined an optical waveguide with
(1) a cladding layer made of pure fused silica and "doped" fused
silica, and (2) "a core formed of fused silica to which a dopant . . .
has been added to a degree in excess of that of the cladding."' 28 In
arguing to distinguish prior art, the patentee in Corning had stated
that "a doping material for purposes of increasing the index of re-
124. Id.
125. Id. Compare the Hi-Life prosecution to that in Hughes. The "disposed through-
out" feature in Hi-Life, like the "external location" feature in Hughes, was added by amend-
ment but was not critical to establishing the invention's novelty (i.e., to distinguish the prior
art). See also Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 867, 869-71 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(stating that where the patentee, in distinguishing a cited reference, had argued that the claim
was limited to compositions that function "without additional outside influences," that the
issue on remand is whether the claims can be extended through equivalents to cover composi-
tions that use "outside influences" other than those that were specifically disclosed in the cited
reference).
126. See also Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981, 988 & n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1988), where the court stated in dicta:
The Examiner felt that [the cited reference] inherently disclosed that the recov-
ery rate and equilibrium pressure of a foam could be varied because that patent
referred to the possibility of manipulating the physical properties of the foam by
controlling the density of the plastic and the size of the pores. . . . Therefore, if
[patentee] was trying to assert rights under the doctrine of equivalents to foam
earplugs having recovery rates and equilibrium pressures controlled by manipu-
lating the pore size or density of the plastic, the patentee might be estopped.
The "estoppel" contemplated by the Specialty Composites court would not limit the claim any
further than the prior art already did.
127. 671 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affid 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
128. Id. at 1385-86.
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fraction of the core . . . is absolutely essential."129
The accused fiber in Corning did not have this "essential"
doped-core feature. Instead of having a mostly pure cladding around
a highly doped core like the patented fiber, the accused fiber had just
the opposite: a highly doped cladding around a core of "substantially
pure fused silica." ' But this difference had no practical signifi-
cance. Whereas the plaintiff-patentee had doped the core to raise its
refractive index, the defendants-accused infringers doped the clad-
ding with a different dopant to lower its refractive index. The de-
fendants thus achieved the same result as the inventors, and the court
ruled that the accused fiber met the Graver Tank test for
equivalency."'
But what about prosecution history estoppel? After all, the pat-
entee had argued that it was "absolutely essential" to dope the core
and to raise the refractive index of the core-and the accused in-
fringer did neither of these things. As in Hughes, the Corning court
concluded that the patentee's remarks in this regard were unneces-
sary to distinguish the prior art. 13 Therefore, the claim covered the
accused fiber through the doctrine of equivalents.
The court's extreme. leniency toward the patentee in Corning is
difficult to reconcile with Hughes and Kinzenbaw. The Corning
court's unwillingness to apply prosecution history estoppel is best ex-
plained by observing that the invention in Corning, an optical
waveguide fiber, was a pioneering invention, 33 whereas the inven-
tion in Kinzenbaw was an improvement in a crowded art,3 and the
invention in Hughes, although a significant breakthrough,' 3 5 was not
a pioneering invention."6 Since the Corning patents covered a pio-
neering invention, these patents were entitled to a broad range of
equivalents.1 3
7
In Kinzenbaw, in contrast to Corning, prosecution history es-
toppel prohibited a finding of infringement by equivalents even
129. Id. at 1388-89 (emphasis omitted).
130. Id. at 1386.
131. Id. at 1399-1400.
132. Id. at 1398.
133. Id. at 1376-78.
134. Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 389.
135. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1352-56.
136. Id. at 1362.
137. See Texas Instruments, Inc. v. International Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563
(Fed. Cir. 1986) ("It has long been recognized that the range of permissible equivalents de-
pends upon the extent and nature of the invention, and may be more generously interpreted
for a basic invention than for a less dramatic technological advance.").
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though the difference between the accused device and that claimed
was of little or no practical significance. " 8 Such also was the case in
Pennwalt. Regardless of the element-by-element dispute discussed in
Part I, the outcome of the Pennwalt decision is quite justifiable in
terms of prosecution history estoppel.
In Pennwalt, the patented machine and the accused machine
were very similar (fruit sorters). Each machine carried items along a
conveyor, from a color-detect station to a weigh station, and beyond.
Each machine had means to correlate the color-detect data with a
certain item, so that at the weigh station the machine would "know"
the color of the item being weighed, and could correctly pair the
weight data with the color-detect data for each item." 9
The manner in which the two machines accomplished the "cor-
relation" differed only slightly, but that difference removed Durand-
Wayland's (the accused infringer) machine from the scope of plain-
tiff Pennwalt's claims. Pennwalt's machine correlated the color-de-
tect data by storing the data in a shift register. The register shifts in
concert with the conveyor, shifting the color-detect data in accor-
dance with the position of the item on the conveyor, and shifting the
data out of the last stage of the register (to the "processing cir-
cuitry") as the item reaches the weigh station. Pennwalt described
this feature as "position indicating means . . . for generating a sig-
nal continuously indicative of the position of the item . . .14
In contrast, Durand-Wayland's machine correlated the color-
detect data by storing the data in a "color value queue.' 4' Unlike in
Pennwalt's shift register, the data within the "color-value queue" is
not shifted. Instead, a pointer indicates the location that contains the
color data corresponding to the next item to reach the weigh station.
Like Pennwalt's shift register, Durand-Wayland's pointer advances
in concert with the conveyor.'4 2
As originally submitted, Pennwalt's claims did not require the
position-indicating means." 8 The prior art cited by the PTO Exam-
iner included the Ramsay patent, which discloses a device for trans-
porting cans past a series of inspection stations. The Ramsay device
included memories called "position indicators," which indicate the
138. Kinzenbaw, 741 F.2d at 389.
139. See 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 550, 560 (district court description of the claimed ma-
chine and of the accused machine).
140. Id. at 564-65.
141. Id. at 569.
142. Id.
143. Pennwualt, 833 F.2d at 937.
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can's position relative to an inspection station, but do not keep track
of the cans as they are transported between inspection stations.' 44
During patent prosecution, Pennwalt added the position-indi-
cating means, 4 ' and the Federal Circuit concluded, from its own
independent evaluation of the prosecution, that "[tihe addition of
that element [the position-indicating means] was crucial to patenta-
bility." '46 Thus, Pennwalt could not extend the claim, through
equivalents, to cover an accused device that lacked the "crucial" posi-
tion-indicating means.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Today, in contrast to the time of Graver Tank, courts apply the
doctrine of 'equivalents almost routinely. The doctrine's basic pur-
pose is no longer as closely tied to the individual equities of a case as
implied by Graver Tank. The modern doctrine of equivalents oper-
ates to help a patentee enforce his patent against an accused in-
fringer when the patent claim does not cover the accused device, but
the patented invention and the accused device are practically and
technically the same thing. Courts have struggled to strike the proper
balance of protection. On one hand, if courts fail to accord patented
inventions a sufficient scope of protection, industry will seek alterna-
tive forms of protection. For example, the business community may
conceal inventions as trade secrets. The resulting decrease in dis-
closed discoveries would slow technological developments. On the
other hand, overprotection of patented inventions would also stifle
innovation by encouraging companies to litigate marginal claims,
thus siphoning off funding and increasing the cost of market entry.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to determine on which side
of the balance the patent law presently rests, but a few brief observa-
tions about the history of the patent law and the doctrine of
equivalents may explain the Federal Circuit's present controversy
over the doctrine of equivalents. The legal history shows that the test
for patent infringement has become more precise and less dependent
on equitable factors as patents and technology have grown in
importance.
The first patent law required that patent applications be re-
144. See 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 562 (district court's discussion of the prior art of rec-
ord in the prosecution).
145. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 937-39.
146. Id. at 937. Furthermore, the accused machines most likely were in the prior art:
"[The] prior art ...like the accused machines, stores the information with respect to sorting
criteria in memories, but [does] not 'continuously' track the location." Id. at 938.
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viewed by a committee of three persons. 47 This requirement soon
overburdened the committee, and, in 1793, Congress decided to grant
patents routinely where the applicant met certain formalities.' 48 The
applicant for patent had to pay a fee and submit a written descrip-
tion of the invention, but the applicant did not have to submit a
claim. Without any patent claim, the court (or jury) decided in-
fringement by determining whether the accused device was "substan-
tially similar" to the device described in the patent." 9
Unlike the 1793 law, the Patent Act of 1836150 required the
applicant to submit patent claims. The Act also required the newly
created Patent Office to examine those claims.15 ' The claiming re-
quirement came "at a time of burgeoning industrial activity and cre-
ativity, growth in patent filings and, inexorably, increasing infringe-
ment litigation."' 52  Also, during this period of increasing
technological development and technology-related litigation, the test
for patent infringement became slightly more precise than the previ-
ous test of "substantial similarity.' 53
With the Patent Act of 1870,154 patent claims began to describe
the invention more specifically and became an important measure of
the scope of the patent right.' 55 In infringement litigation, the courts
focused on the patent claim instead of the specification. Thus, the
Supreme Court stated the classic "same-same-same" formulation of
the doctrine of equivalents in Machine Co. v. Murphy. 5
Since the 1870's, patent claims have become increasingly de-
tailed and precise. Presently, the doctrine of equivalents determines
the equivalence of an accused device to another device described in
the particular patent claim. We can naturally expect the doctrine's
precision to increase concomitantly with that of the claims to which
it is applied. Moreover, when industry increases technological activ-
ity' patents and patent litigation become more important. The law
reacts by defining patent rights with more certainty.
147. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10 (1790).
148. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321-22 (1793). See Pennwall, 833
F.2d at 957 (Newman, J., commentary) (discussing history of patent law).
149. Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432).
150. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836).
151. Id.
152. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 958 (footnote omitted) (Newman, J., commentary).
153. See Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
154. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
155. See, e.g., White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52 (1886) (emphasizing the importance of
precise claim language).
156. 97 U.S. 120 (1878).
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Businesses place great emphasis on patents, intellectual prop-
erty in general, and on patent litigation."5 7 Many businesses regard
patent litigation as a highly lucrative endeavor.15 In these circum-
stances, certainty in the law defining patent rights is critical. To
lower the stakes in patent litigation, or at least to enable businesses
to evaluate a potential litigation more accurately, businesses want
and need reliable guides to help predict whether a court would find
infringement in different situations. If unrestrained, the doctrine of
equivalents will deprive businesses of such predictability.
Granted, the doctrine inevitably lengthens patent litigation and
increases the litigation's cost and complexity because the doctrine
often requires technical experts. Nonetheless, many of the reasons
for the doctrine so eloquently stated in Graver Tank still apply. If
all patentees could not count on the doctrine of equivalents, they
would be forced to predict equivalents yet to be developed. Such a
burden would be ridiculous. Moreover, patents would swiftly decline
in value.
On the other hand, certainty and predictability as to questions
of patent infringement are paramount in these days of huge verdicts
and permanent injunctions which shut down major portions of busi-
nesses.' 59 The doctrine of equivalents continues to evolve as the Fed-
eral Circuit attempts to give businesses clearer rules governing ex-
ploitation of that recently rediscovered corporate crown jewel (or
corporate sabre), the patent. If this move toward certainty is a claim-
limiting trend, then at least it is offset by the concurrent decline of a
different claim-limiting device, prosecution history estoppel.
157. The New High-Tech Battleground, supra note 7, at 1, col. 8.
158. The New High-Tech Battleground, supra note 7, at 1, col. 8.
159. See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 835 F.2d
277, 278-79 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (permanent injunction stayed pending appeal would have halted
$200 million annual business). See also Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 641 F. Supp.
828 (D. Mass. 1985), affd, 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850
(1986); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Dam-
ages in the Polaroid case are estimated at $5.7 billion, and in Hybritech, the permanent in-
junction forced Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., to stop selling products accounting for 80 percent
of the company's revenue and to lay off 30 percent of its work force. The New High-Tech
Battleground, supra note 7, at 1, col. 6.
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